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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the fight against trademark infringement, brand owners have in 
recent years adopted a new tactic: bringing suit against the individuals 
responsible for the manufacture and sale of counterfeit goods.1  Because 
defendants in these lawsuits sometimes fail to appear in court, plaintiffs 
instead seek the profits made by these counterfeiters as a remedy.2  In 
several recent cases, luxury brands Tiffany and Gucci have done just 
this.  As part of discovery, Tiffany and Gucci requested several 
defendants’ bank records from Chinese-owned banks to determine the 
profits made by the defendants.3  The banks challenged these discovery 
requests, forcing the courts to address whether the Hague Convention on 
Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague 
Evidence Convention) or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal 
Rules) should be used to order evidence disclosure from non-party 
Chinese banks.4 
The seminal Supreme Court case on the issue of discovery abroad is 
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District 
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 1.  Minning Yu, Note, Benefit of the Doubt: Obstacles to Discovery in Claims Against Chinese 
Counterfeiters, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2987, 2996–98 (2013). 
 2.  Id. at 2990–91, 2997–98.  The Lanham Act establishes civil remedies for trademark 
violations, including recovery of the defendant’s profits.  15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012).  The Act 
authorizes the seizure of “records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved in 
such violation,” which may then be used by the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s sales.  Id. §§ 1116–
1117. 
 3.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 145–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gucci Am., 
Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 
2011); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *3–4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012). 
 4.  Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 152–54; Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *22–25; Tiffany, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *17–21. 
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Court for the Southern District of Iowa.5  In Aerospatiale, the Supreme 
Court held that the Hague Evidence Convention provided optional 
measures for obtaining evidence abroad and did not prevent district 
courts from ordering foreign parties to produce evidence located abroad 
under the Federal Rules.6  As a result, courts are to perform a five-step 
comity analysis to determine whether to use the Hague Evidence 
Convention or the Federal Rules.7  Writing for the dissent, however, 
Justice Blackmun argued that the Hague Evidence Convention should be 
the first resort for United States courts for obtaining evidence abroad.8  
According to Justice Blackmun, the Hague Evidence Convention better 
addresses issues of comity and national interests for both the United 
States and foreign states.9 
The holding and method of comity analysis from Aerospatiale was 
employed in the aforementioned cases involving Tiffany and Gucci.10  
As part of their suits, the plaintiffs—Tiffany and Gucci—requested 
disclosure of information regarding the defendants’ bank accounts from 
the New York branches of several Chinese banks under the Federal 
Rules.11  The banks objected to disclosure of information held in their 
Chinese branches, claiming such disclosure would violate Chinese 
banking laws, and requested that the plaintiffs use the Hague Evidence 
Convention procedures to complete their discovery requests. 12   In 
determining whether to use the Federal Rules or the Hague Evidence 
Convention, the courts used the five-factor comity analysis mentioned in 
Aerospatiale (along with two additional factors used in the Southern 
District of New York).13  The use of the comity analysis in these cases, 
                                                          
 5.  482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 6.  Id. at 538. 
 7.  Id. at 544 n.28. 
 8.  Id. at 548–49. 
 9.  Id. at 551–68. 
 10. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gucci Am., Inc. v. 
Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011); 
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 23, 2012). 
 11.  Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 145–46; Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *1–2; Tiffany, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *3–4. 
 12.  Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 146; Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *5–6; Tiffany, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *5. 
 13.  Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 151; Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *15–16; Tiffany, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *12–13.  The two additional factors are the nature of the hardship and 
the good faith of the party resisting discovery.  Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 151; Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97814, at *16; Tiffany, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *13. 
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however, led to inconsistent outcomes despite similar circumstances and, 
in some instances, identical evidence.  However, the analysis in the 
Tiffany cases came to the most workable conclusion: courts should 
“forebear from assuming that the Hague Evidence Convention is not a 
viable option until Chinese authorities have had a meaningful 
opportunity to comply with similar requests but have failed to do so.”14 
Part II of this paper will discuss the legal background and courts’ 
analysis of the Tiffany and Gucci cases.  Part II will also look at the laws 
and legal opinions governing evidence disclosure abroad for use in 
United States litigation as well as Chinese laws on judicial assistance and 
banking privacy.  Part III will discuss the problems with the current 
analysis as it is applied to non-party Chinese banks in these cases.  The 
current analysis permits a pro-forum bias and places courts in the 
position of weighing the relative interests of the United States and 
foreign sovereigns.  Part III will argue that the resolution in the Tiffany 
cases was the ideal result.  Giving China a chance to comply with a 
Hague Evidence Convention request best serves the interests of both the 
United States and China while remaining sensitive to the interests of the 
parties involved in the suit. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  Methods of Foreign Discovery in United States Courts 
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
The Federal Rules govern the discovery process in United States 
federal courts.  Under Federal Rule 26, parties to the litigation, without 
the use of an intermediary, may “obtain discovery regarding any non-
privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.”15  
While the Federal Rules provide standards for gathering a number of 
different types of evidence, the cases involved in this analysis involve 
requests to produce documents served on non-parties.  Federal Rule 45 
governs the use of subpoenas to compel non-parties to a lawsuit to 
produce documents.16  A subpoena may command the person on whom it 
is served to “produce designated documents, electronically stored 
                                                          
 14.  Tiffany, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *21. 
 15.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 16.  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
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information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or 
control.”17  Additionally, courts may hold in contempt any person who 
fails to respond to a subpoena without adequate excuse.18  Parties can 
also move to compel disclosure under Federal Rule 37.19 
2. The Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters 
 The Hague Evidence Convention, concluded in 1970,20 was intended 
to bridge the gap between common law and civil law jurisdictions,21 and 
“establish a system for obtaining evidence located abroad that would be 
‘tolerable’ to the state executing the request and would produce evidence 
‘utilizable’ in the requesting state.”22  One issue which causes particular 
contention is pretrial discovery, particularly the “aggressive” nature of 
American-style discovery.23  Common law jurisdictions, like the United 
States, use an adversary system to litigate cases,24 and parties to the 
lawsuit are responsible for collecting and presenting evidence to support 
their arguments.25  Because this system is based on the idea “that each 
party will have an equal ability to discover the evidence in his favor,” 
parties use pretrial discovery to equalize their access to evidence.26  This 
is in stark contrast to civil law jurisdictions, in which parties are only 
responsible for their own cases and are not obligated to produce adverse 
information for the other party.27  Additionally, the judge in civil law 
jurisdictions plays a primary role in bringing forth relevant evidence.28  
                                                          
 17.  Id. 
 18.  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g). 
 19.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). 
 20.  Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. 
 21.  James A.R. Nafziger, Another Look at the Hague Evidence Convention After Aerospatiale, 
38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 103, 103–04 (2003). 
 22.  Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 530 (1987) (quoting PHILIP W. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON 
TAKING EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, S. EXEC. DOC. A 92-2, at 11 
(1972)). 
 23.  Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1998); Bernard H. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct 
Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence 
Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 733, 769 (1983). 
 24.  Hazard, supra note 23, at 1019. 
 25.  KUO-CHANG HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW 7 (2003). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 26–27. 
 28.  Hazard, supra note 23, at 1019. 
WEST_FINAL DRAFT - AUTHOR REVIEW 10-30.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:52 AM 
2014] A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLY 193 
Thus, pretrial discovery, as used in the American system, is often seen as 
an affront to the sovereignty and operation of courts in civil law 
jurisdictions.29 
 In order to address these differences, the Hague Evidence 
Convention provides three methods by which signatories may conduct 
evidence disclosure in foreign states: (1) letters of request, (2) use of a 
diplomatic or consular agent, or (3) use of a private commissioner.  
Chapter I of the Hague Evidence Convention covers evidence disclosures 
through letters of request. 30   A judicial authority of a state that has 
acceded to the treaty (a contracting state) may use a letter of request to 
obtain evidence.31  Under Article 2, each contracting state designates a 
central authority.32  This authority is responsible for receiving letters of 
request from judicial authorities in other contracting states and 
transferring those letters to the relevant authority.33  However, “[l]etters 
of [r]equest . . . do not rely solely on comity for execution.” 34   A 
contracting state is obligated to execute a letter of request 
expeditiously,35 and the Hague Evidence Convention only provides two 
conditions under which a contracting state may refuse to execute a letter 
of request.36 
                                                          
 29.  Id. at 1017. 
  30. A letter of request (also known as a letter rogatory) is  
[a] document issued by one court to a foreign court, requesting that the foreign 
court (1) take evidence from a specific person within the foreign jurisdiction or 
serve process on an individual or corporation within the foreign jurisdiction and (2) 
return the testimony or proof of service for use in a pending case. 
  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (9th ed. 2009). 
 31.  Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 20, at art. 1. 
 32.  Id. at art. 2. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Ronald E. Myrick, Obtaining Evidence Abroad for Use in United States Litigation, 15 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.J. 1, 15 (1991). 
 35.  Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 20, at art. 9. 
 36.  Id. at art. 12. 
The execution of a Letter of Request may be refused only to the extent that: 
a) in the State of execution the execution of the Letter does not fall within the 
functions of the judiciary; or 
b) the State addressed considers that its sovereignty or security would be 
prejudiced thereby. 
Execution may not be refused solely on the ground that under its internal law the 
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Chapter II of the Hague Evidence Convention covers the taking of 
evidence by diplomatic officers and consular agents, as well as 
commissioners.  Diplomatic officers and consular agents may take 
evidence from nationals of the state they represent.37  They may also take 
evidence from nationals of their host state as long as a competent 
authority grants permission and they abide by the rules of that 
permission.38  Persons appointed as commissioners may take evidence 
abroad without compulsion and with the permission of a competent 
authority, granted they follow the conditions of the permission.39  In 
addition to these methods of taking evidence, Article 23 of the 
Convention allows a contracting state to “declare that it will not execute 
Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery 
documents as known in Common Law countries.”40 
China acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention in 1997 and 
designated the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) as its central authority.41  While 
China is a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention, it included a 
number of reservations as part of its accession to the treaty.42  First, 
Chapter II is not applicable with the exception of Article 15, which 
authorizes diplomatic officers or consular agents to take evidence from 
nationals of the state they represent. 43   Second, in accordance with 
Article 23, China has declared it will only execute such requests for 
pretrial discovery when the documents are clearly enumerated in the 
letters of request and those documents have a “direct and close 
                                                          
State of execution claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the 
action or that its internal law would not admit a right of action on it. 
 37.  Id. at art. 15. 
 38.  Id. at art. 16. 
 39.  Id. at art. 17. 
 40.  Id. at art. 23. 
 41.  Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/ 
index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=82 (last visited October 27, 2013); Authorities, HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details 
&aid=490 (last visited October 27, 2013). 
 42.  Upon accepting or acceding to a treaty, a state may include reservations as to certain terms, 
in effect rejecting that term of the treaty.  MARK JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (6th ed. 2012).  
Other parties to the treaty may need to actually accept the reservation in order to make the 
modification legally binding.  Id.  However, if the treaty has explicitly allowed for certain 
reservations, acceptance may be assumed.  Id.  In Article 23, the Hague Evidence Convention 
explicitly allows for states to make a reservation not to execute requests for pretrial discovery.  
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 20, at art. 23. 
 43.  Declarations Notifications Reservations, Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 20, 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=status.comment&csid=493&disp=resdn (last 
visited October 27, 2013). 
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connection with the subject matter of the litigation.”44  As a member of 
the Hague Evidence Convention, the MOJ is obligated to execute 
requests that comply with its reservation and to do so in an expedient 
manner. 
3. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Iowa 
The seminal Supreme Court case regarding foreign discovery under 
the Hague Evidence Convention is Societe Nationale Industrielle 
Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Iowa.45  In Aerospatiale, two American citizens brought suit against two 
French corporations in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Iowa for negligence and breach of warranty.46  Following the 
American litigants’ second set of discovery requests under the Federal 
Rules, the French parties filed a motion for a protective order, arguing 
that the Hague Evidence Convention was the “exclusive and mandatory 
procedure[] for obtaining documents and information located within the 
territory of a foreign signatory.” 47   In a five-to-four decision, the 
Supreme Court held the Hague Evidence Convention was neither an 
exclusive nor a mandatory means of obtaining discovery abroad; rather, 
the Convention provided another option, but this option did not displace 
the Federal Rules when conducting discovery in United States 
litigation.48  The Court declined to adopt a rule of first resort because use 
of the Hague Evidence Convention would be “unduly time consuming 
and expensive” 49  in certain circumstances, and was less certain to 
produce the requested evidence than the Federal Rules.50 
In place of a bright-line rule, the Court provided a five-factor comity 
analysis taken from the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (Revised) Section 437(1)(c), which United States courts 
use in determining whether to conduct foreign discovery under the 
                                                          
 44.  Id. 
 45.  482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 46.  Id. at 524–25. 
 47.  Id. at 525–29. 
 48.  Id. at 538–40. 
 49.  Id. at 542.  The Court did not provide any evidence to support either of these contentions.  
Id. at 561 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 50.  Id. at 542 (noting that in cases in which the Hague Evidence Convention would produce 
more evidence more quickly, the first-use strategy would prevail). 
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Federal Rules or the Hague Evidence Convention.51  The analysis weighs 
five factors: 
(1) the importance to the . . . litigation of the documents or other 
information requested; 
(2) the degree of specificity of the request; 
(3) whether the information originated in the United States; 
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and 
(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would 
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance 
with the request would undermine important interests of the state 
where the information is located.52 
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that in most cases, courts 
should resort to the Hague Evidence Convention because “the 
Convention provides effective discovery procedures that largely 
eliminate the conflicts between United States and foreign law on 
evidence gathering.”53  An individualized analysis of a case would only 
be necessary when use of the Convention would be unhelpful or futile.54  
While Justice Blackmun agreed the Convention was not meant to be 
mandatory, he also asserted it was more than merely advisory.55  The 
Hague Evidence Convention had been crafted to further important 
United States’ interests by creating greater access to discovery in civil 
law countries and maintaining a “climate of cooperation and goodwill 
necessary to the functioning of the international legal and commercial 
systems.”56  Justice Blackmun also warned that courts are ill-suited to 
balance the interests of foreign states against those of the United States.57  
This would increase the likelihood of a “pro-forum bias” in comity 
analyses with United States courts often resorting to local rules.58 
                                                          
 51.  Id. at 544 n.28. 
 52.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) 
§ 437(1)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1986)). 
 53.  Id. at 548–49 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 54.  Id. at 549. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 550. 
 57.  Id. at 552. 
 58.  Id. at 553. 
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B. Applicable Chinese Laws 
1. Judicial Assistance 
Evidence disclosure conducted by foreign states in China is governed 
domestically by the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (Civil Procedure Law).59   Article 277 provides that “[j]udicial 
assistance shall be requested and provided through the channels 
prescribed in an international treaty concluded or acceded to by the 
People’s Republic of China; or in the absence of such a treaty, shall be 
requested and provided through diplomatic channels.”60  Absent these 
circumstances or permission from an authorized agency of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), no foreign authority or individual may serve 
process, conduct an investigation, or collect evidence within the territory 
of the PRC.61 
In addition to the Civil Procedure Law, the Supreme People’s Court 
also promulgated the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Handling Requests for Judicial Assistance in Service of Judicial 
Documents, Investigation and Taking of Evidence in Civil and 
Commercial Cases in Accordance with International Conventions and 
Bilateral Treaties on Judicial Assistance (Provisions on Judicial 
Assistance).62  Under this law, requests by China for judicial assistance 
in foreign countries shall be carried out pursuant to the Hague Evidence 
Convention.63  Requests for judicial assistance in China made by foreign 
countries shall be conducted according to the Civil Procedure Law and 
any relevant judicial interpretations.64 
                                                          
 59.  Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minshi Susong Fa (2012 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国民
事诉讼法(2012 修正)) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012 Amendment)] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Apr. 9, 1991) 
(Lawinfochina) (China). 
 60.  Id. at art. 277. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyü Yijü Guoji Gongyue He Shuangbian Sifa Xiezhu Tiaoyue 
Banli Minshangshi Anjian Sifa Wenshu Songda He Diaocha Qüzheng Sifa Xiezhu Qingqiude 
Guiding (最高人民法院关于依据国际公约和双边司法协助条约办理民商事案件司法文书送达
和调查取证司法协助请求的规定 ) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Handling 
Requests for Judicial Assistance in Service of Judicial Documents, Investigation and Taking of 
Evidence in Civil and Commercial Cases in Accordance with International Conventions and 
Bilateral Treaties on Judicial Assistance] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 7, 2013, effective 
May 2, 2013) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
 63.  Id. at art. 1. 
 64.  Id. at art. 3. 
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2. Banking Laws 
China’s banking privacy regime is created by a number of laws that 
prohibit the disclosure of information regarding bank accounts and 
provide penalties for any entity that violates such laws.  One of the key 
laws relating to Chinese banks is the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Commercial Banks (Commercial Banks Law).65  Article 6 of 
the Commercial Banks Law requires commercial banks to “protect the 
legal rights and interests of . . . depositors against . . . encroachment [by] 
any entity or individual.”66  Under Article 73, a commercial bank that 
illegally discloses information about, freezes, or debits a deposit account 
is subject to a number of penalties depending on the damage caused.67  In 
cases where there have been no illegal gains, the “banking regulatory 
organ of the State Council” shall impose a fine of no less than ￥50,000 
renminbi to no more than ￥500,000 renminbi.68 
The Notice of the People’s Bank of China on Promulgating the 
Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions’ Assistance in 
the Inquiry, Freeze or Deduction of Deposits (Financial Institutions’ 
Assistance Provisions) provides the conditions under which certain 
financial institutions—including wholly state-owned commercial 
banks—can disclose depositor information, freeze accounts, or debit 
funds from accounts.69  A notice of a request for disclosure must be 
served by an officer of a competent organ, and financial organs are 
prohibited from accepting notices served by anyone other than an officer 
of a competent organ.70  The regulation provides a list of authorities who 
are competent to request such information. 71   According to the 
                                                          
 65.  Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Shangye Yinhang Fa (2003 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国
商业银行法 (2003 修正 )) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective June 1, 1995) 
(Lawinfochina) (China).  
 66.  Id. at art. 6. 
 67.  Id. at art. 73. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Zhonghua Renmin Yinhang Guanyü Fabu “Jinrong Jigou Xiezhu Chaxün, Dongjie, 
Kouhua Gongzuo Guanli Guiding” de Tongzhi (中国人民银行关于发布《金融机构协助查询、冻
结、扣划工作管理规定》的通知) [Notice of the People’s Bank of China on Promulgating the 
Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions’ Assistance in the Inquiry, Freeze or 
Deduction of Deposits] (promulgated by the People’s Bank of China, Jan. 15, 2002, effective Feb. 1, 
2002) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
 70.  Id. at art. 21. 
 71.  Id. at art. 24. 
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regulation, the Supreme People’s Court is competent to make such 
requests but foreign courts are not.72 
The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China also provides 
penalties for entities that disclose private banking information.73  Under 
Article 253(A), a financial entity that illegally discloses private 
information on citizens in the course of its duties is subject to 
punishment if the circumstances are serious.74  These penalties include 
imprisonment or criminal detention of no more than three years, fines, or 
both.75 
C. Recent Cases Involving Discovery Requests Directed at Non-Party 
Chinese Banks 
The Southern District of New York has recently decided a number of 
cases involving trademark suits brought by American corporations 
against Chinese counterfeiters.  In each case, the plaintiffs attempted to 
compel discovery of bank records from non-party Chinese banks under 
the Federal Rules, and the banks asked the court to instead use the Hague 
Evidence Convention due to conflicts between the Federal Rules and 
internal Chinese law.  Following the ruling in Aerospatiale, the judges 
applied a five-factor comity analysis, plus two additional factors used in 
the Southern District,76 to determine whether to conduct discovery under 
the Federal Rules or the Hague Evidence Convention.  Despite almost 
identical circumstances, the courts in these cases reached different 
conclusions on how to conduct the requested discovery. 
1. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew 
In Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew (hereinafter Tiffany I), luxury 
goods manufacturer Tiffany brought claims against several Chinese 
defendants who were selling counterfeit Tiffany goods on websites 
                                                          
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingfa Xiuzheng An (Qi) (中华人民共和国刑法修正案
(七)) [Amendment (VII) to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009, effective Feb. 28, 2009) (Lawinfochina) 
(China). 
 74.  Id. at art. 254. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Gucci Am., 
Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20834, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 
2010)). 
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hosted in the United States.77  Tiffany served a subpoena pursuant to 
Federal Rule 45 on the New York branches of the Bank of China 
(BOCNY), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBCNY), 
and China Merchants Bank (CMBNY) for records related to the 
defendants’ accounts.78  All three banks searched their records held in the 
United States but were unable to find any documents matching the 
information provided by the plaintiffs.79  The banks also claimed that 
records kept outside of the United States were beyond their “custody[] or 
control,” 80  and that producing such documents held in China would 
violate Chinese law.81  Both BOCNY and IBCNY did, however, offer to 
assist the plaintiffs in preparing a discovery request pursuant to the 
Hague Evidence Convention. 82   The plaintiffs moved to compel 
production of the documents. 83   In response, the banks opposed the 
motion, arguing they did not “have custody or control of documents 
located in China” and the “plaintiffs’ motion should be denied in 
accordance with notions of comity.”84 
The court dismissed the banks’ first argument finding the records 
held in China were within the New York branches’ custody and 
control.85  Next, the court turned to the issues of comity raised by the 
banks.  The banks contended that compliance with the subpoena would 
require violating several Chinese laws—specifically, China’s banking 
privacy laws.86  Because of this conflict of laws, the court engaged in the 
five-factor comity analysis mentioned in Aerospatiale, along with two 
additional factors used in the Southern District, to determine whether the 
banks should be compelled to produce the documents under the Federal 
                                                          
 77.  Id. at 145. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 81.  Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 158. 
 82.  Id. at 146. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 147–50.  Courts use a rebuttable presumption that “[a] corporation . . . [has] custody 
and control of its own records ordinarily required in the course of business . . . .”  Id. at 148.  Since 
the subpoenas were served on the corporate entity of the banks (not just their individual branches), 
the banks were unable to show that the banks as a whole did not have control over records kept in 
China.  Id. at 149. 
 86.  Id. at 150. 
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Rules or whether further evidence disclosure should be conducted under 
the Hague Evidence Convention.87 
On the first and second factors of the comity analysis (importance of 
the documents to the litigation and the specificity of the request), the 
court found in favor of the plaintiffs—the information requested was 
important because it could reveal the identities of counterfeiters and 
other defendants, and the document request was sufficiently specific.88  
The third factor (origin of information) weighed in favor of the banks 
because the Chinese bank records clearly originated outside the United 
States.89 
While the first three factors of the analysis were relatively 
straightforward in this case, the analysis of the fourth and fifth factors 
proved more contentious.  The fourth factor of the comity analysis 
required the court to determine if there was an alternative means to the 
Federal Rules of securing the information requested.90  In support of their 
argument, the plaintiffs cited language which had previously been posted 
on the United States Department of State website stating: 
While it is possible to request compulsion of evidence in China 
pursuant to a letter rogatory or letter of request (Hague Evidence 
Convention), such requests have not been particularly successful in the 
past.  Requests may take more than a year to execute.  It is not unusual 
for no reply to be received or after a considerable time has elapsed, for 
Chinese authorities to request clarification from the American court 
with no indication that the request will eventually be executed.91 
In response, the banks argued this language was not necessarily 
indicative of the current treatment of Hague Evidence Convention 
requests in China.  First, they noted this language had since been 
removed from the website.92  While the State Department did not provide 
its reason for the removal, the banks claimed the removal suggested the 
State Department no longer regarded the information as accurate.93  In 
further support of their argument, the banks also cited statistics on the 
MOJ website reporting China had executed approximately fifty percent 
of the letters of request it had received in the past five years, with 
                                                          
 87.  Id. at 151 (citing In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 88.  Id. at 151–52. 
 89.  Id. at 152. 
 90.  Id. at 151. 
 91.  Id. at 153. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
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requests taking an average of six to twelve months to be executed.94  The 
MOJ had also executed thirty-seven requests in the first half of 2010.95  
CMBNY also noted, however, that because “the Chinese legal system 
has been developing rapidly over the last several years . . . there [was] 
little precedent concerning Chinese handling of Hague Convention 
requests.”96 
Both the plaintiffs and the banks provided expert opinions in support 
of their positions.97  Many of the proffered opinions relied on either the 
language removed from the State Department website or the statistics 
provided by the MOJ.98  After review, the court concluded the experts 
were interpreting the same empirical evidence in different ways; thus, 
their opinions did not push the analysis in favor of either party.99  The 
court was ultimately unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ arguments that 
requests for evidence disclosure under the Hague Evidence Convention 
would be “futile” and found the fourth factor in favor of the banks.100 
The fifth factor required the court to balance United States’ interests 
involved in the case against foreign sovereign interests.101  The banks 
contended, “China has a significant interest in enforcing its banking 
privacy laws” because such laws are necessary to create confidence in 
China’s relatively new banking system.102  The plaintiffs countered by 
arguing the “United States interest in fully and fairly adjudicating matters 
before its courts . . . outweighs [a foreign country’s interest] in protecting 
the confidentiality of its banking customers’ records.”103  The plaintiffs 
also argued that the United States has a significant interest in enforcing 
its trademark laws.104  The court ultimately found in favor of the banks, 
noting that Chinese banking laws “have few exceptions and appear to 
                                                          
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 156. 
 97.  Id. at 154–55. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 155. 
 100.  Id. at 156. 
 101.  Id. at 151. 
 102.  Id. at 156. 
 103.  Id. at 157. 
 104.  Id. 
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provide harsh consequences for violations.”105  The court also found the 
banks’ status as non-parties swayed this factor in their favor.106 
The court continued with the two additional factors used by the 
Southern District in a comity analysis: the nature of the hardship (sixth 
factor) and the good faith of the party resisting discovery (seventh 
factor).  To demonstrate hardship, the banks needed to show there was a 
possibility of civil punishment, criminal punishment, or both if they were 
forced to comply with the subpoena, and that the possibility was more 
than speculative.107  The banks cited to two cases in which BOC had 
been punished for unintentionally disclosing information protected by 
banking privacy laws.108   The plaintiffs argued these cases were not 
identical to the present case, but failed to provide any evidence of a 
Chinese bank complying with a United States court for disclosure of 
evidence without incurring consequences.109  The court found the banks’ 
argument more persuasive on this factor.110 
Since there was no evidence in the record of the banks acting in bad 
faith, the court also found the seventh and final factor (use of good faith) 
in favor of the banks.111  Finding that the comity analysis on the whole 
weighed in favor of the banks, the court directed the plaintiffs to request 
evidence disclosure for the Chinese bank records through the Hague 
Evidence Convention, and if such request proved futile, plaintiffs would 
then be able to “renew their application to enforce their subpoenas.”112 
2. Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li 
One month after Tiffany I, Gucci America, Inc. also attempted to 
compel evidence disclosure from BOCNY.  Gucci served BOCNY with 
a subpoena on July 13, 2010. 113   On July 26, 2010, BOCNY filed 
objections claiming, as in Tiffany I, that it did not have custody or control 
of records in China, compliance with the subpoena would violate 
                                                          
 105.  Id. at 158. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 158–59. 
 109.  Id. at 159. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 160. 
 112.  Id. at 160–61. 
 113.  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011). 
WEST_FINAL DRAFT - AUTHOR REVIEW 10-30.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/11/2014  9:52 AM 
204 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
Chinese bank secrecy laws, and the request should be made under the 
Hague Evidence Convention.114  BOC eventually produced documents 
possessed by its New York branch but refused to produce any documents 
possessed by any of its Chinese branches.115 
In this case, the court also conducted the seven-factor comity 
analysis to determine whether BOC would be compelled to produce 
evidence under the Federal Rules.  For reasons similar to those used in 
Tiffany I, the court found the first factor (importance of documents to 
litigation)116 and second factor (specificity of the request)117 in favor of 
the plaintiffs, and the third factor (whether information originated in the 
United States)118 and seventh factor (good faith)119 in favor of BOC.  The 
court’s analysis of factors four, five, and six differed from Tiffany I and 
ultimately led to the opposite outcome. 
In analyzing whether there was an alternative means for securing the 
information sought (fourth factor), the Gucci court rejected the Tiffany I 
court’s standard that the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Hague 
Evidence Convention would be “futile.”120   Instead, the court, citing 
language from Aerospatiale, required that BOC show a Hague Evidence 
Convention request would be “effective.”121  In arguing its case, BOC 
again pointed to the removal of the language quoted in Tiffany I from the 
State Department’s website, and similar statistics on the execution of 
Hague Evidence Convention requests in China.122  The court, however, 
reviewed prior jurisprudence on requests under the Hague Evidence 
Convention in the Southern District of New York and concluded the 
general opinion was that such requests were prone to indefinite delays 
and uncertain to ever be executed. 123   In addition, while the expert 
opinions provided by the plaintiffs cited the language from the State 
Department website, the court found the opinions sufficiently relied on 
                                                          
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at *6. 
 116.  Id. at *16–18. 
 117.  Id. at *18–19. 
 118.  Id. at *19–20. 
 119.  Id. at *35–36. 
 120.  Id. at *22. 
 121.  Id. (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of 
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987)). 
 122.  Id. at *21–22. 
 123.  Id. at *23–26. 
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other sources of information to support their conclusions.124  Therefore, 
the court did not find the unexplained removal of the language from the 
State Department’s website persuasive, and found the fourth factor in 
favor of the plaintiffs.125 
In balancing the national interests of the United States and China 
(fifth factor), the Gucci court also differed from Tiffany I by finding the 
interests of enforcing United States law more significant.126  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court noted that Chinese banking secrecy laws could 
be waived by a number of entities and thus resembled more of an 
“individual privilege” for customers rather than “a national policy 
entitled to substantial deference.”127  According to the court, the Chinese 
government’s failure to object to disclosure in the case only highlighted 
the lack of a significant national interest.128  The United States’ interest 
in enforcing its intellectual property laws thus outweighed any nominal 
interest China might have in its banking secrecy laws.129 
The final factor in which the Gucci court disagreed with Tiffany I 
was hardship of compliance (sixth factor).  BOC again cited two cases in 
which it had been punished for unintentionally disclosing client 
information.130  The court found the cases to be inapposite as they did not 
involve requests for evidence disclosure by a foreign court. 131   In 
addition, BOC was unable to cite to any instance of a Chinese bank being 
punished for complying with a foreign request for evidence disclosure.132  
Because there was no definitive evidence that BOC would be punished 
for complying with the subpoena, the Gucci court found the threat of 
sanction too speculative and found for the plaintiffs.133 
3. Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse 
In a third case decided almost a year after Gucci, Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. 
Forbse (hereinafter Tiffany II), the court again applied a comity analysis 
                                                          
 124.  Id. at *26–27. 
 125.  Id. at *27. 
 126.  Id. at *27–31. 
 127.  Id. at *29. 
 128.  Id. at *29–30. 
 129.  Id. at *31. 
 130.  Id. at *32–33. 
 131.  Id. at *33–34. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at *35–36. 
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to determine if three Chinese banks—BOC, CMB, and ICBC—would be 
compelled to disclose evidence under the Federal Rules.134  In analyzing 
the fourth factor (availability of alternative means), the court noted that 
the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale had advised courts to “demonstrate 
due respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on 
account of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any 
sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.” 135   In arguing their 
positions, both sides again cited the statistics from the MOJ website, and 
the plaintiffs pointed out that over six months had passed since the 
Tiffany I court had transmitted a Hague Evidence Convention request, 
and China had yet to respond.136 
The banks, however, were also able to submit a letter from two 
Chinese financial regulatory bodies, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC), and the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), 
addressed to four judges in the Southern District of New York.137  The 
letter stated that the banks are prohibited by Chinese law from disclosing 
customer account information in response to a United States court 
order.138  Therefore, they asked the judges to require parties to request 
such information through the Hague Evidence Convention procedures.139  
The letter also expressed that the PBOC and CBRC “are committed to 
actively coordinating with the PRC Ministry of Justice and judicial 
organs in the PRC to ensure that they satisfy that requests for seeking 
evidence under the Hague Convention within a reasonable time period 
and by following the procedures thereunder.”140  Because the Chinese 
government had expressed willingness to cooperate and the statistics 
provided by both sides remained speculative, the court decided the best 
option was to “forebear from assuming that the Hague Convention is not 
a viable option until Chinese authorities have had a meaningful 
opportunity to comply with similar requests but have failed to do so.”141 
                                                          
 134.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *12–13 
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012). 
 135.  Id. at *18 (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. 
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987)). 
 136.  Id. at *19–21. 
 137.  Id. at *18.  The letter was addressed to Judges Sullivan, Pauley, Pitman, and Batts, who all 
had similar cases on their dockets.  See id. at *18 n.7. 
 138.  Id. at *18. 
 139.  Id. at *18–19. 
 140.  Id. at *19. 
 141.  Id. at *20–21. 
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For the fifth factor (balancing national interests), the court found the 
United States’ interest in enforcing its intellectual property laws in 
balance with Chinese interests in upholding its bank secrecy laws.142  It 
also agreed with the Gucci court and found the possibility of sanctions 
(sixth factor—hardship) to be too speculative in this case, specifically 
noting that the large ownership interest of the Chinese government in 
each of the banks would be a disincentive to any governmental 
regulatory actions.143  It ultimately ordered discovery under the Hague 
Evidence Convention for CMB and ICBC, but ordered discovery under 
the Federal Rules for BOC because the bank had acted in bad faith.144 
III. ANALYSIS 
The comity analysis as applied to non-party Chinese banks in these 
cases reveals a number of problems, particularly in the Gucci case.  The 
cases since Aerospatiale fall into a general trend in which courts 
demonstrate a pro-forum bias, often choosing to compel evidence 
disclosure under the Federal Rules even when doing so would violate 
foreign law.145  The courts were also placed in a position to weigh United 
States and Chinese sovereign interests. 146   Despite these issues, the 
outcome in the Tiffany cases provided the most even-handed approach to 
evidence disclosure from China: providing the Chinese government a 
chance to comply with the Hague Evidence Convention before turning to 
the Federal Rules. 
A. Current Comity Analysis in the Wake of Aerospatiale 
The use of the seven-factor comity analysis resulted in two different 
outcomes in the above cases: giving China the chance to comply with the 
Hague Evidence Convention procedures before resorting to the Federal 
Rules in the Tiffany cases, and granting a motion to compel evidence 
disclosure under the Federal Rules in Gucci.147  The courts reached these 
disparate results despite having similar or identical evidentiary 
                                                          
 142.  Id. at *21–25. 
 143.  Id. at *25–28. 
 144.  Id. at *30–31. 
 145.  See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 146.  See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 147.  See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
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records.148  The current method of comity analysis used in these cases 
has a number of flaws which allowed for such disparate outcomes.  First, 
the current method of analysis allows courts to show an unfounded 
preference for United States’ interests and the Federal Rules when 
weighing factors.149  This is particularly problematic when looking at 
cases that require a non-party to violate a foreign law in order to comply 
with a United States court order.  Additionally, this method also allows 
for outcomes to be unduly influenced by attitudes toward the Chinese 
legal and banking systems.150 
1. Pro-Forum Bias and Criticism of Aerospatiale 
The minority in Aerospatiale predicted the new rule created by the 
case would be susceptible to a “pro-forum bias,” and courts would often 
resort to more familiar local rules rather than those of the Hague 
Evidence Convention.151  Consistent with this prediction, a pro-forum 
bias has been the general trend of court decisions after Aerospatiale with 
many lower courts failing to give the laws and interests of foreign states 
the weight they may deserve.152  The issue has even been recognized by 
the American Bar Association (ABA), which issued a resolution in 2012 
urging United States courts to show greater deference to data protection 
and privacy laws of foreign sovereigns in discovery requests in civil 
litigation.153 
In its resolution, the ABA noted that forcing parties to choose 
between violating foreign law or noncompliance with a United States 
discovery order “is inconsistent with promotion of rule of law, as it 
facilitates violation of law, either abroad or here.”154  The resolution 
specifically addresses the analysis of foreign banking privacy laws, 
finding that while some United States courts have recognized the validity 
of a foreign state’s interest in enforcing banking privacy laws, those 
                                                          
 148.  See discussion supra Part II.D.1–2. 
 149.  See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 150.  See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 151.  See supra text accompanying note 146. 
 152.  Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague Evidence Convention, 38 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 73, 82 (2003); Joseph P. Griffin & Mark N. Bravin, Beyond Aerospatiale: A Commentary on 
Foreign Discovery Provisions of the Restatement (Third) and the Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 INT’L LAW. 331, 337 (1991). 
 153.  ABA Res. 103 (adopted by A.B.A. H.D., Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2012_hod_midyear_meeting_103.do
c [hereinafter ABA Res. 103]. 
 154.  Id. at 3. 
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courts still tend to focus their analysis on whether the government has 
objected to the discovery order, and “any applicable exceptions to the 
foreign law and any ability of a banking customer to waive secrecy.”155  
This method of analysis frequently results in United States courts 
enforcing local discovery procedures over “challenges predicated on 
foreign banking statutes.”156 
The Tiffany and Gucci cases follow in this trend.  Rather than 
acknowledge that the existence of multiple Chinese regulations on the 
disclosure of deposit account information expresses the will of the 
Chinese government regarding bank privacy issues, all three cases 
looked to whether the Chinese government specifically objected to the 
particular request for evidence disclosure.157  In Tiffany II, the objection 
of two Chinese financial regulatory bodies helped push the analysis in 
favor of a request under the Hague Evidence Convention.158  In Gucci, 
the absence of any objection swayed the analysis in favor of the Federal 
Rules.159 
Interestingly, the PBOC and CBRC eventually issued a letter 
objecting to the discovery requests at issue in Gucci.160  The regulatory 
organs stated that they had issued a “severe warning” to BOC and were 
investigating BOC to determine the severity of the violation and the 
appropriate sanctions.161  While the court did not admit this letter as 
evidence in a later proceeding, it noted that even if evidence of the 
warning and investigation were admitted, it would not change the 
outcome of the analysis.162  Even though BOC had been warned and was 
under investigation, the PBOC and CBRC had not yet imposed sanctions 
or determined that BOC would definitely face sanctions, so the threat of 
punishment was still “unduly speculative.”163  This method of reasoning 
appears to place banks (or other parties that are asked to violate foreign 
                                                          
 155.  Id. at 14. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Tiffany (NJ) LLC 
v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *18–20 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); 
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 23, 2011). 
 158.  Tiffany, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *18–20. 
 159.  Gucci, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *29–30. 
 160.  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72650, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012). 
 161.  Id. at *13–14. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at *14. 
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law to comply with the order of a United States court) in a precarious 
position—the only way they can prove they will be sanctioned is if they 
are actually sanctioned first.164 
These cases also took note of any exceptions to the rule and the 
ability of governmental entities to waive secrecy, even coming to 
opposite conclusions despite analyzing the same law.  The Tiffany I court 
concluded that Chinese banking privacy laws had few exceptions and 
harsh penalties, supporting the court’s decision to proceed with discovery 
under the Hague Evidence Convention.165  The Gucci court found that 
the waivers and exceptions included in the banking privacy laws 
demonstrated that banking privacy was not of significant national interest 
to China, which helped push the court towards use of the Federal 
Rules.166  The Tiffany II court, while giving deference to the Chinese 
government’s intervention, still “question[ed] the true extent of the 
Chinese interests at stake in [the] matter.”167  The court noted that the 
laws most certainly were not intended to protect counterfeiters, which 
was underscored by the number of Chinese governmental organs that 
may override banking secrecy provisions.168 
The trend of pro-forum bias is only exacerbated when general 
attitudes or anxieties about the Chinese legal system and banking system 
are added to the mix.  In their article Brand Name Replicas and Bank 
Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties Towards Chinese Banks in 
the Tiffany and Gucci Cases, attorneys Megan Chang and Terry Chang 
argue that rather than representing a disinterested analysis, the reasoning 
used in these cases reflects general anxieties and negative attitudes the 
United States has towards China.169 
The authors first analyzed another banking privacy case, SEC v. 
Stanford International Bank Ltd., in which the court noted that Swiss 
banking laws served the “legitimate purpose of protecting commercial 
privacy.”170  The court held that the Hague Evidence Convention struck 
                                                          
 164.  See ABA Res. 103, supra note 153, at 15. 
 165.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 166.  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *28–30. 
 167.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *24 
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Megan C. Chang & Terry E. Chang, Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring 
Attitudes and Anxieties Towards Chinese Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 425, 439 (2013). 
 170.  SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 336 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing 
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the right balance between the interests of both the United States and 
Switzerland because its “use will benefit U[nited] S[tates’] interests by 
providing the needed evidence, and protect Swiss interests by avoiding 
intrusions upon Swiss sovereignty.”171  The authors noted that similar 
language acknowledging the legitimacy of China’s interest in its banking 
laws and the ideal balancing of interests under the Hague Evidence 
Convention was absent from the Tiffany and Gucci cases.172  This is in 
especially stark contrast to the language used in Gucci, which found that 
China’s banking secrecy laws were a customer privilege rather than a 
significant national interest.173 
In addition to this double standard, the cases involving Chinese 
banks also spent a great deal of time trying to assess whether China 
would execute requests under the Hague Evidence Convention—a 
question that was not even raised in the Swiss bank cases.174  The authors 
suggest this is because the court “found it unthinkable that the Swiss 
government would not comply with the Hague Convention.”175  Nor did 
any of the courts consider an intrusion on Chinese sovereignty as 
something that should necessarily be avoided.  These comparisons are 
not meant to be an exhaustive study of the ways in which the Southern 
District of New York has analyzed foreign states’ interests in their 
banking privacy laws.  They can provide some light, though, as to the 
particular attitudes of the courts in the Tiffany and Gucci cases regarding 
China’s sovereign interests. 
These issues come on top of the serious criticism the Aerospatiale 
ruling has faced since being handed down.  Two years after the ruling, 
the Hague Conference issued a Special Commission Report on the 
operation of the Hague Evidence Convention. 176   The report 
acknowledged that contracting states disagreed as to whether the 
                                                          
Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Serv’s, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). 
 171.  Id. at 337 (quoting Brief of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522 (1987) (No. 85-1695), 1986 WL 727499, at *11). 
 172.  Chang & Chang, supra note 169, at 438–39. 
 173.  Gucci Am., Inc., v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *29–
31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2012). 
 174.  Chang & Chang, supra note 169, at 439. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Special Commission Report on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the 
Hague Evidence Convention, April 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1556. [hereinafter 1989 Special Commission 
Report]. 
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Convention procedures were exclusive. 177   The Commission noted, 
however, that given the object of the Convention, first priority should be 
given to the Convention procedures regardless of whether a state 
regarded such procedures as exclusive.178 
In addition, most American commentary on the Aerospatiale ruling 
has also been highly critical both of the decision itself, and of its failure 
to provide clearer guidelines to lower courts.179  One scholar called the 
ruling a “disappointment”180 for failing to adopt a rule of first resort to 
the Hague Evidence Convention in the interest of international comity.181  
Another asserted the Aerospatiale ruling “create[ed] an undesirable and 
unworkable framework in which lower courts must make determinations 
about the appropriate use of the [Hague Convention].”182  A third stated 
that by failing to create an appropriate analytical framework, the decision 
“threaten[ed] to lead to conceptual chaos and may exacerbate rather than 
reduce current conflicts.”183  This is certainly not a comprehensive list of 
American criticism of the Aerospatiale ruling.  These commentaries do, 
however, show a common concern: that the case was decided wrongly 
and, at the very least, has left lower courts with a confusing and 
unworkable standard by which to determine whether to carry out foreign 
discovery under the Federal Rules or the Hague Evidence Convention. 
On the other hand, one particularly persuasive student note points out 
that the Aerospatiale decision should be credited with creating a rule of 
law in an area in which none existed before.184  While not specifically 
stated in the opinion, the Supreme Court may have had several important 
                                                          
 177.  Id. at 1564. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Borchers, supra note 152, at 79; see also George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence 
Convention in the Supreme Court: A Critique of the Aerospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525 
(1989); David J. Gerber, International Discovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical 
Framework, 82 A.J.I.L. 521, 530 (1988) (stating that the Court “failed to locate the principles it 
discussed in either a conceptual or a factual context”); Griffin & Bravin, supra note 152, at 349; 
Patricia Anne Kuhn, Comment, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: The Supreme Court’s 
Misguided Approach to the Hague Convention, 69 B. U. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Joseph Weis, The 
Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions: Concerns of Conformity and Comity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 
903 (1989). 
 180.  Bermann, supra note 179, at 526. 
 181.  Id. at 536. 
 182.  Griffin & Bravin, supra note 152, at 349. 
 183.  Gerber, supra note 179, at 522. 
 184.  J. Albert Garcia, Note, A Look Behind the Curtain, or Why the Hague Convention Had to 
Be Effectively Nullified, 23 TEX. INT’L L.J. 269, 288 (1988). 
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American interests in mind in making its decision.185  First, the Court 
may have concluded that the United States entered into the Hague 
Evidence Convention with the purpose of creating an international 
system of discovery more like the American system.186  Second, United 
States courts had been conducting extraterritorial discovery under the 
Federal Rules for some time, and there is little to suggest that the United 
States government wanted to limit this practice.187  Last, and perhaps 
most significantly, the Court may have been attempting to protect the 
ability of United States courts to fairly adjudicate claims.188 
While these interests are important considerations, they fail to 
support the Aerospatiale decision and the resulting framework as a 
whole.  The Hague Evidence Convention is widely understood as an 
instrument designed to bridge the gap between common law (specifically 
American) discovery procedures and civil law evidence disclosure.189  
Thus, by entering into the Convention, the United States was offering a 
compromise in the way its courts and litigants conducted discovery in 
signatory countries.  Second, use of the Hague Evidence Convention 
does not necessarily preclude the fair adjudication of claims in United 
States courts.190  Additionally, while the adjudication of claims is of 
utmost importance to United States courts, discovery abroad implicates 
other United States and foreign interests which must be considered in 
reaching a solution. 
2.  Special Considerations: Non-Party Status and Nature of Claim 
Another major issue in these cases is the significance of the Chinese 
banks’ status as non-parties to the lawsuits.  Based on the Hague 
Evidence Convention’s legislative history, the authors appear to have 
                                                          
 185.  Id. at 280–83. 
 186.  Id. at 281. 
 187.  Id. at 282–83. 
 188.  Id. at 282. 
 189.  Nafziger, supra note 21, at 104. 
 190.  In a 2003 study of American attorneys who had used the Hague Evidence Convention 
procedures, nineteen of thirty-seven respondents reported the use of the Convention did not delay 
litigation.  Report on Survey of Experience of U.S. Lawyers with the Hague Evidence Convention 
Letter of Request Procedures, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. INT’L LAW & PRACTICE 10–11.  Fourteen of thirty 
respondents were able to obtain all the documents requested, while eighteen of thirty indicated the 
evidence obtained had an impact on the resolution of the case.  Id. at 6, 9.  While sixty percent of 
respondents felt their experience was not as satisfactory as expected, seventy-three percent reported 
they were “glad” they had used the Convention procedures and would use them again in similar 
circumstances.  Id. at 6. 
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been primarily concerned with obtaining the testimony of witnesses 
outside the forum court’s jurisdiction, although the final draft did not 
limit the convention’s scope on this issue. 191   Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Aerospatiale, several United States courts held that the 
Hague Evidence Convention would only apply in cases where production 
of evidence was requested from an entity who was neither a party to the 
lawsuit nor subject to the court’s jurisdiction. 192   The Aerospatiale 
opinion, however, held that the Hague Evidence Convention procedures 
would be available for evidence obtained from non-parties or litigants 
because the text of the Convention drew no distinction between the 
two.193 
Despite the Court’s ruling, some cases have again begun to recognize 
the significance of the status of the entity requesting use of the Hague 
Evidence Convention, at least when such requests are due to banking 
privacy laws or blocking statutes.194  Courts are more likely to compel 
discovery through the Federal Rules if the party is a litigant.195  This 
makes sense because a litigant requesting use of the Hague Evidence 
Convention is either a plaintiff seeking the benefits of United States law 
while attempting to block discovery, or a defendant who may have 
violated United States law.196  However, a non-party requesting the use 
of the Hague Evidence Convention does not raise these concerns. 
When non-parties are ordered to produce evidence, it “raises both 
questions of jurisdictional power (whether the United States court has the 
authority to compel production pursuant to United States rules) and 
system concerns (in that this type of order would seem particularly 
offensive to the host state involved).” 197   Because many such cases 
involve a non-party under the control of a litigant (e.g., a foreign 
                                                          
 191.  Oxman, supra note 23, at 757–58. 
 192.  Hannah L. Buxbaum, Assessing Sovereign Interests in Cross-Border Discovery Disputes: 
Lessons from Aerospatiale, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 87, 99 (2003). 
 193.  Id. at 99 (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. 
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 524, 541, 546 (1987)). 
 194.  Monica Hanna & Michael A. Wiseman, Discovering Secrets: Trends in U.S. Courts’ 
Deference to International Blocking Statutes and Banking Secrecy Laws, 130 BANKING L.J. 692, 
696 (2013).  A blocking statute is a law “enacted to [strictly] prohibit the production of specific 
documents or entire categories of documents of particular concern to the foreign sovereign.”  Id. at 
692. 
 195.  Id. at 696. 
 196.  Peninsula Asset Mgmt. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Hankook Tire Co., No. 5:04-CV-1153, 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27815, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005), aff’d, 476 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 197.  Buxbaum, supra note 192, at 99. 
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subsidiary of a corporation located in the United States), courts may 
more readily resolve the issue in favor of the use of the Federal Rules on 
jurisdictional grounds.198   Cases involving a non-party not under the 
control of a litigant, however, will raise different system-based 
concerns. 199   As one court noted, civil law nations regard discovery 
within their borders as a violation of their sovereignty because fact-
gathering is the responsibility of judges in their legal system.200  These 
orders are “particularly offensive” in cases where the entity being 
ordered to produce evidence is a non-party to the suit.201  Here, courts are 
left to decide how best to balance the parties’ as well as the sovereigns’ 
interests, which can lead to disparate outcomes in similar cases.202  While 
recent cases involving non-parties have been inconsistent in their 
findings,203 courts have developed a general rule that use of the Hague 
Evidence Convention is mandatory when ordering discovery from a non-
party.204 
Both Tiffany cases continued in this development by acknowledging 
the significance of the bank’s status as a non-party.  In Tiffany I, the 
court found “the Banks’ status as non-parties . . . attenuate[d] the United 
States interest in enforcing discovery obligations.”205   Tiffany II also 
came to the same conclusion, citing Tiffany I.206  The Gucci court, on the 
other hand, failed to adequately take account of BOC’s non-party 
status.207   This likely made use of the Federal Rules more probable, 
because the court did not consider the sovereign interests involved in 
ordering discovery from a non-party located in a civil law jurisdiction.  
                                                          
 198.  See id. at 99–100. 
 199.  See id. (discussing the ruling in Orlich v. Helm Bros., 560 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1990)). 
 200.  Orlich, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 15. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Hanna & Wiseman, supra note 194, at 698–99. 
 203.  Id. at 698. 
 204.  Nafziger, supra note 21, at 110 (citing PKFinans Int’l Corp. v. IBJ Schroder Leasing Corp., 
No. 93-5375, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15183 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1996); Intercontinental Credit Corp. 
v. Roth, 595 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Orlich, 560 N.Y.S.2d 10); Griffin & Bravin, supra 
note 152, at 349 n.76 (citing Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Orlich, 
560 N.Y.S.2d at 15); Richard M. Dunn & Raquel M. Gonzalez, The Thing about Non-U.S. 
Discovery for U.S. Litigation: It’s Expensive and Complex, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 342, 347 (2000) 
(citing In re Honda Am. Motor Co., 168 F.R.D. 535, 540 (D. Md. 1996); Triple Crown Am., Inc. v. 
Biosynth AG, No. Civ.A. 96-7476, 1998 WL 227886 (E.D. Penn. April 30, 1998)). 
 205.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 206.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *23 
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012). 
 207.  Chang & Chang, supra note 169, at 439. 
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In addition, by failing to recognize the banks’ non-party status, the court 
“seemed to project some culpability on the bank.”208  While the issue of 
non-party status may not be dispositive,209 it weighs heavily in favor of 
use of the Hague Evidence Convention because of the lack of 
involvement of non-parties in the suit and the sovereign interests at stake. 
Another key consideration is the nature of the claim being brought 
and the subsequent interests that claim implicates.  Both the Tiffany and 
Gucci cases were civil suits targeted at counterfeiters violating American 
trademark law.  Counterfeiting is undoubtedly a problem, both in the 
United States and worldwide.  By some estimates, counterfeiting is worth 
$600 billion a year, constituting five to seven percent of world trade.210  
China holds a special position in the counterfeiting trade, standing as the 
world’s top manufacturer and exporter of counterfeit goods.211  China 
has, in recent years, made great strides in its protection of intellectual 
property rights.  Chinese law provides a number of domestic 
enforcement methods, including special courts that deal exclusively with 
intellectual property cases.212  In addition, China has become party to a 
number of international treaties that obligate it to bring itself in line with 
international standards on intellectual property rights.213  Regardless of 
these developments, though, counterfeiting in China continues to be a 
problem for American businesses. 
Courts have routinely recognized the importance of enforcing 
American trademark laws in order to combat counterfeiting.  The Tiffany 
and Gucci cases all acknowledged that the United States has a strong 
interest in protecting its trademark laws. 214   Courts have even 
                                                          
 208.  Id. at 439. 
 209.  Hanna & Wiseman, supra note 194, at 696. 
 210.  Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/ 
products-and-services/fighting-commercial-crime/counterfeiting-intelligence-bureau/ (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2014). 
 211.  Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2012 Seizure Statistics, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 
BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF INT’L TRADE, 15 http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/FY2012%20IPR%20Seizure%20Statistics_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
 212.  Matthew A. Marcucci, Navigating Unfamiliar Terrain: Reconciling Conflicting 
Impressions of China’s Intellectual Property Regime in an Effort to Aid Foreign Right Holders, 23 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1395, 1415–16 (2013) (citing MARTIN K. DIMITROV, 
PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 101 (2009)). 
 213.  Kimberly Shane, Culture, Poverty, and Trademarks: An Overview of the Creation and 
Persistence of Chinese Counterfeiting and How to Combat It, 16 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 137, 143–
45 (2012). 
 214.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations omitted); 
Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. May 
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acknowledged the enforcement of trademark laws as a public interest 
issue because of the harm done to consumers by counterfeit goods.215  
Despite this, the interest in enforcing intellectual property rights does not 
invoke the same public interests as other types of cases.  For one, 
trademark cases generally involve private parties rather than the United 
States government.216  Second, the interest in protecting trademark laws 
is not as compelling as other interests, which implicate public safety 
concerns, such as terrorism.217 
A recent case involving BOC, Wultz v. Bank of China, addressed the 
issue of compelling discovery in order to combat terrorism.218  In Wultz, 
family members of a victim of a terrorist bombing brought suit against 
BOC for its alleged involvement in the financing of terrorism.219  As in 
the Tiffany and Gucci cases, BOC requested the use of the Hague 
Evidence Convention for discovery in China. 220   In balancing the 
sovereign interests of the United States and China, the Southern District 
of New York found that when the fight against terrorism is combined 
with the need of United States courts to fully and fairly adjudicate cases, 
the “U.S. interest is elevated to nearly its highest point, and diminishes 
any competing interests of the foreign state.”221  The court ultimately 
ordered discovery under the Federal Rules.222 
The decision in Wultz is understandable given the threat to public 
safety and United States sovereignty that terrorism poses.  
Counterfeiting, on the other hand, may be a multi-billion dollar a year 
business, but it does not implicate the same public safety issues as 
                                                          
23, 2012) (citations omitted). 
 215.  Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., 219 F.3d 104, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing 
United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1987)). 
 216.  See Tiffany, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *22 (“Nevertheless, the interest of the United 
States is not as great in this context—in which the discovery request is initiated by a private, civil 
litigant—as it would be if the request were initiated by the U.S. government for purposes of an 
enforcement proceeding.”) (citations omitted). 
 217.  See Wultz v. Bank of China, 910 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (tort claim based 
on financing of terrorism) (“Even in [Tiffany II] where the U.S. interest was not as great as it is 
here—because it was limited to the defense of intellectual property rights and protecting consumers 
from counterfeit products—the court concluded that those interests outweighed the Chinese 
interests.”) (citations omitted). 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 550. 
 220.  Id. at 551. 
 221.  Id. at 559 (quoting Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012)). 
 222.  Id. at 560. 
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terrorism.  Thus, while cases based on terrorism may easily outweigh any 
interest of a foreign sovereign, counterfeiting cases do not carry the same 
weight. 
B. Tiffany I and II: The Best Approach to Ordering Discovery 
Tiffany I and II came to the most workable conclusion when dealing 
with evidence disclosure in China: allowing China a chance to execute a 
letter of request through the Hague Evidence Convention before 
resorting to the Federal Rules.  This holding adequately takes into 
account China’s sovereign interests without being overly deferential to a 
legal system that has less transparency than many modern nation-states.  
The holding in Tiffany I and II also acknowledges China’s explicit 
commitment to complying with the Hague Evidence Convention and 
provides a better response to inconclusive evidence on China’s history of 
executing Hague Evidence Convention requests.  The ruling adequately 
accounts for the banks’ status as non-parties and the nature of the suit 
being brought.  It also serves the long-term interests of the United States 
by working to improve the often-tense relations between the United 
States and China.  Thus, the approach used in the Tiffany cases would 
serve the interests of both the United States and China while still 
providing viable means of evidence disclosure for litigants. 
1. China’s Sovereign Interests and Commitment to the Hague 
Evidence Convention 
In the Tiffany and Gucci cases, the courts addressed China’s 
sovereign interest in its banking privacy laws.223  A primary goal of 
China’s banking privacy laws is to encourage the development of the 
Chinese banking and financial system.224  According to Article 1 of the 
Commercial Bank Law, the law’s purpose is to “protect[] the legal rights 
and interests of commercial banks, depositors and other clients . . . 
safeguard[] the financial order and promot[e] the development of the 
socialist market economy.” 225   In his expert testimony in Tiffany I, 
                                                          
 223.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse , 276 F.R.D. 143, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. 
Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); Gucci 
Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, at *27–30 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 23, 2011). 
 224.  See Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 160 (recognizing China’s interest in “encouraging use of, and 
confidence in, its relatively new banking system”). 
 225.  Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Shangye Yinhang Fa (2003 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国
商业银行法 (2003 修正 )) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks] 
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Professor James Feinerman of Georgetown Law School also confirmed 
that China’s banking privacy laws were created to instill “confidence in a 
relatively new banking system and to ‘[e]ncourag[e] its citizens who had 
historically been skeptical about the safety of their deposits in banks—
and their continued access to them—[to utilize Chinese banks by 
providing] the strongest possible assurances of confidentiality.’” 226  
Having a “relatively new banking system” means China has had fewer 
chances to enforce its laws against violators, and the Chinese 
government has had fewer chances to express its national interest in 
lawsuits involving these laws.  Yet, these are the exact factors courts 
analyze in determining the weight of a sovereign’s interest and the 
hardship of compliance for a non-party compelled to disclose evidence. 
The holding in the Tiffany cases also recognizes China’s 
commitment to the Hague Evidence Convention and better conforms to 
China’s decisions to integrate the Hague Evidence Convention into 
domestic law.  By signing the Hague Evidence Convention, the Chinese 
government has already expressed its intention to abide by the rules 
therein.  The Civil Procedure Law essentially makes the Hague Evidence 
Convention the mandatory procedure for foreign states collecting 
evidence within China.227  The Provisions on Judicial Assistance also 
explicitly state that the Hague Evidence Convention is the method by 
which China will conduct evidence disclosure in foreign countries.228  
Specifically regarding litigation related to banking and finance, both the 
PBOC and the CBRC have expressed their willingness to assist in the 
                                                          
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective June 1, 1995) 
(Lawinfochina) (China). 
 226.  Tiffany, 276 F.R.D. at 156. 
 227.  Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minshi Susong Fa (2012 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国民
事 诉讼 法 (2012 修正 )) [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012 
Amendment)](promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective 
Apr. 9, 1991) (Lawinfochina) (China); see Fang Shen, Are You Prepared for This Legal Maze?: 
How to Serve Legal Documents, Obtain Evidence, and Enforce Judgments in China, 72 UMKC L. 
REV. 215, 229 (2003) (“Chapter 29, Article 236 of the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC provides that 
‘in requesting or offering judicial assistance, the procedures spelled out in the international treaties 
signed or joined by the PRC shall be followed.’”). 
 228.  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyü Yijü Guoji Gongyue He Shuangbian Sifa Xiezhu Tiaoyue 
Banli Minshangshi Anjian Sifa Wenshu Songda He Diaocha Qüzheng Sifa Xiezhu Qingqiude 
Guiding (最高人民法院关于依据国际公约和双边司法协助条约办理民商事案件司法文书送达
和调查取证司法协助请求的规定 ) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Handling 
Requests for Judicial Assistance in Service of Judicial Documents, Investigation and Taking of 
Evidence in Civil and Commercial Cases in Accordance with International Conventions and 
Bilateral Treaties on Judicial Assistance] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 7, 2013, effective 
May 2, 2013) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
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execution of requests through the Hague Evidence Convention for 
banking records kept in China. 229   These factors combined, show a 
willingness on the part of the Chinese government to abide by the 
provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention. 
The approach used in the Tiffany cases also deals better with the 
inconclusive nature of the evidence regarding the execution of Hague 
Evidence Convention requests in China.  China was faulted for having 
inadequate information regarding its compliance with Hague Evidence 
Convention requests, yet it is by no means unique in this regard.  In 2003 
and 2008, the Hague Conference issued questionnaires regarding the 
execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests.230  The PRC did not 
respond to either questionnaire, but the information for a number of other 
states is available, including the United States. 231  In its response to the 
questionnaire, the United States claimed it had no system for keeping 
track of how many Hague Evidence Convention letters of request were 
actually executed. 232   The United States also claimed that letters of 
request can take anywhere from one month to two years to execute.233  
Given that the United States was unable to provide accurate statistics on 
the number of requests executed and the average length of time for 
execution, faulting China for the same lack of information hardly seems 
appropriate.  And while China admittedly did not respond to the 
questionnaires, the Chinese legal system has been developing rapidly in 
the past few years.  Penalizing China for omissions from several years 
ago is hardly the best course of action. 
Furthermore, China has spent “the past thirty years . . . engaged in 
what is perhaps the most rapid development of any legal system in the 
history of the world.”234  Given this state of affairs, the likelihood that 
                                                          
 229.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *19 
(S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012). 
 230.  Publications: Questionnaires & Responses: Responses Received 2003, HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details 
&pid=3054&dtid=33 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Publications 2003]; Publications: 
Questionnaires & Responses: Responses Received 2008, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L 
LAW, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=4457&dtid=33 (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Publications 2008]. 
 231.  Publications 2003, supra note 230; Publications 2008, supra note 230. 
 232.  PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, QUESTIONNAIRE OF 
MAY 2008 RELATING TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 18 MARCH 1970 ON THE TAKING OF 
EVIDENCE ABROAD 12, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/2008usa20.pdf. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Benjamin L. Liebman, Assessing China’s Legal Reforms, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 17, 18 
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China would have had inconclusive statistics on its history of executing 
requests is not entirely surprising.  However, a number of reforms 
suggest China may now be better equipped to deal with the execution of 
Hague requests. 
Chinese reforms have led to increased professionalization with better 
legal education systems, more “legally-trained personnel,” and higher 
professional and educational standards for judges.235   Legislation has 
shifted its focus from economic development to cover a wider range of 
topics, including public and private law. 236   Additionally, many of 
China’s legal reforms “have sought to bring China into line with 
international practice.”237  Given China’s unique position as a developing 
state with a rapidly developing legal system, courts should not continue 
to punish China for problems related to its legal system without 
conclusive evidence of their existence and without ever giving China a 
chance to rectify those problems.  The only way China can fall in line 
with international practices under the Hague Evidence Convention is if it 
is given the chance to do so. 
2. How the Hague Evidence Convention Can Benefit the United 
States 
The Hague Evidence Convention is also better suited to bridge gaps 
between United States and Chinese law.  The purpose of the Hague 
Evidence Convention was to eliminate conflicts between common law 
countries like the United States and civil law countries like China.238  
While the Convention may have been aimed specifically at evidentiary 
law, it can also help to address other conflicts-of-law issues like those 
seen in Tiffany I, Tiffany II, and Gucci.239 
By using the Hague Evidence Convention, litigants could acquire the 
information requested without forcing Chinese non-parties to violate 
domestic Chinese law.  The use of a Hague Evidence Convention letter 
                                                          
(2009). 
 235.  Id. at 22. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. at 19. 
 238.  Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 
U.S. 522, 550 (1987). 
 239.  See generally Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Gucci 
Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 10 Civ. 4974, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97814, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 
2011); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148 (S.D.N.Y. May 
23, 2012). 
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of request would put Chinese government authorities in the position to 
collect the requested information.  Letters of request through the Hague 
Evidence Convention go first to the MOJ and are then transferred to the 
relevant local court.240  Because certain Chinese government authorities 
(but not foreign courts) can waive bank secrecy laws and collect 
otherwise confidential information, the use of the Hague Evidence 
Convention provides a way to legally collect the information plaintiffs 
need.241  If forced to produce evidence under the Federal Rules, however, 
Chinese banks would be forced to make a choice between non-
compliance with a United States court order or risk incurring penalties 
under Chinese law.  As noted in the ABA resolution, such a choice is 
inconsistent with the general promotion of the rule of law.242 
Forcing Chinese non-parties to make such a Hobson’s choice also 
works against many of the United States’ long-term interests.  While the 
United States has a significant short-term interest in the quick and fair 
adjudication of suits brought in its courts, it also has a substantial long-
term interest in “[furthering and maintaining] the climate of cooperation 
and goodwill necessary to the functioning of the international legal and 
commercial systems.”243  By failing to show due respect for the laws of 
foreign sovereigns, United States courts work against broader United 
States’ interests in this area generally.  A lack of respect for China’s 
sovereign interests places strain on the United States’ already tense 
political and economic relations with China specifically.  Furthermore, 
forcing Chinese banks to produce evidence in violation of Chinese law 
could also discourage Chinese banks or other businesses from setting up 
in the United States out of fear that United States court orders would 
force them to violate either domestic or foreign law.244 
At the same time, United States courts should not forsake the 
interests of American parties in order to defer to the sovereign interests 
of states whose legal systems are not particularly transparent.  If a state’s 
                                                          
 240.  Yu, supra note 1, at 3000. 
 241.  See generally Zhonghua Renmin Yinhang Guanyü Fabu “Jinrong Jigou Xiezhu Chaxün, 
Dongjie, Kouhua Gongzuo Guanli Guiding” de Tongzhi (中国人民银行关于发布《金融机构协助
查询、冻结、扣划工作管理规定》的通知 ) [Notice of the People’s Bank of China on 
Promulgating the Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions’ Assistance in the 
Inquiry, Freeze or Deduction of Deposits](promulgated by the People’s Bank of China, Jan. 15, 
2002, effective Feb. 1, 2002) (Lawinfochina) (China). 
 242.  ABA Res. 103, supra note 153, at 3. 
 243.  Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 550. 
 244.  See ABA Res. 103, supra note 153, at 15. 
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legal system has serious transparency issues and well-established 
problems executing Hague Evidence Convention requests, United States 
courts should not have to continue resorting to the Hague Evidence 
Convention for evidence disclosure as a first resort.  Thus, a bright-line 
rule of first resort may not be an ideal resolution to the problems created 
by the Aerospatiale ruling.  China admittedly does have some 
transparency issues, but has made significant strides in bringing its legal 
system in line with international standards.245  In such a situation, the 
holding in the Tiffany cases represents a fair compromise between the 
interests of a developed state like the United States and a developing 
state like China. 
The Tiffany cases’ rulings could also be used to cure a number of 
common criticisms of post-Aerospatiale jurisprudence.  It eliminates the 
pro-forum bias in court decisions, which has come in the wake of the 
Aerospatiale ruling and has been roundly criticized.  The ruling is also in 
line with the Hague Conference’s recommendation that use of the 
Convention should be a first priority in the courts of contracting states.246  
Furthermore, it provides a standard to apply in similar cases, removing 
the confusion and uncertainty which currently reign in this area. 
This is not to say that the analysis in Tiffany I and Tiffany II was 
without issue.  The court still looked to the frequency of sanctions for 
violating banking secrecy laws in determining China’s national interests 
and the hardship of compliance for the bank. 247   As noted above, 
however, if China’s banking system is relatively new and the legal 
system is still developing, the record of enforcement may be scant.  This 
places the banks in the position of having to be sanctioned in order to 
prove they will be sanctioned.248  Moreover, Tiffany II also held that 
because of large state ownership interests in the banks, it was unlikely 
that the banks would be sanctioned by the government.249  This was in 
spite of the fact that the banks were able to cite cases in which they had 
been already sanctioned for unintentionally violating bank secrecy 
laws.250  Despite these issues, the Tiffany cases were still able to reach an 
                                                          
 245.  See generally Liebman, supra note 234, at 17. 
 246.  1989 Special Commission Report, supra note 176, at 1564. 
 247.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 158–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Tiffany (NJ) 
LLC v. Forbse, No. 11 Civ. 4976, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72148, at *25–28 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 
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 250.  Id. at *25–26. 
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outcome that best balanced the interests of the sovereigns and parties 
involved. 
3. Guidelines for Compliance 
In order to protect the United States’ interest in fully and fairly 
adjudicating cases, courts should adopt some guidelines in determining 
whether China has complied with a Hague Evidence Convention request.  
Two key factors in determining if a request has been successful are the 
time taken to execute the request and the quality and quantity of the 
documents produced. 251   According to the Report of the Special 
Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, the average time taken 
to execute a letter of request internationally was between one to six 
months. 252   This average is consistent with a survey of American 
attorneys who reported the majority of their letters of request had been 
executed within six months.253  Since the MOJ reported that the average 
time taken to execute requests in China was six to twelve months,254 six 
months should be a workable time frame for China to execute its 
requests. 
China will also need to produce documents of a certain quality and 
quantity to demonstrate compliance.  China’s reservation to the Hague 
Evidence Convention does put limits on what documents the MOJ will 
produce.255  However, this should not necessarily entitle them to refuse to 
produce documents relevant to United States litigation.  When the court 
in Tiffany I evaluated the success of the letter of request sent under the 
Hague Evidence Convention, the court determined the request had not 
been “futile” because the documents produced had disclosed important 
information.256  A general guideline, then, for production of documents is 
                                                          
 251.  See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Andrew, No. 10 Civ. 9471, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160522, 
at *7–11 (S.D.N.Y. November 7, 2012) (evaluating the success of a letter of request under the Hague 
Evidence Convention by addressing the time taken to execute the request and the importance of the 
documents produced). 
 252.  Hague Conference on Private International Law: Report of the Special Commission on the 
Operation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, reprinted in 24 I.LM. 1668, 1674 (1985). 
 253.  Report on Survey of Experience of U.S. Lawyers with the Hague Evidence Convention 
Letter of Request Procedures, 2003 A.B.A. SEC. INT’L LAW & PRACTICE 10–11. 
 254.  See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 255.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 256.  Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Andrew, No. 10 Civ. 9471, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160522, at *7–11 
(S.D.N.Y. November 7, 2012). 
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whether the documents produced disclosed information important to the 
litigation.  If China fails to produce relevant documents or does not do so 
within the allotted timeframe, courts can then compel disclosure through 
the Federal Rules. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While some transparency issues remain regarding the judicial 
assistance and evidence disclosure process in China, the rapid 
development of the Chinese legal system and the absence of any reliable 
statistics on execution make accurate determinations of the treatment of 
Hague Evidence Convention requests difficult.  With the increasing 
commercial interaction between the United States and China, litigation 
between the states is almost certain to increase.  Thus, courts need to 
have some guiding principle to deal with the rapidly changing state of 
Chinese law, as well as other nations in China’s position. 
The Tiffany cases’ holdings, that China should be given a chance to 
execute a letter of request under the Hague Evidence Convention before 
resorting to the Federal Rules, is the best resolution of the issues 
presented in these cases.  It balances the short-term interests of the 
United States in adjudication with China’s sovereign interests as well as 
the United States’ own long-term interests in international cooperation.  
The holding also provides an ideal way of dealing with the rapidly 
changing state of the Chinese legal system by giving China the chance to 
comply with international standards of practice.  Adding some new 
guidelines on what China must do to comply with Hague Evidence 
Convention requests will help litigants know what to expect in cases, 
while upholding the interests of both the parties and sovereigns involved. 
 
